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Central Intelligence Agency



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 August 1984	
SUCCESSION TO KHOMEINI: IMPLICATIONS FOR IRANIAN POLICY	25X1
Summary	
Ayatollah Khomeini's health is declining, although he does not now appear to be dying. The incapacitation or death of the Islamic Republic's charismatic leader would not lead to a quick unraveling of Iran's clerical regime. After nearly six years in power, the clerical network of institutions and instruments of repression are too well entrenched to whither away soon.	25X1
Ayatollah Montazeri is the most likely immediate successor to Khomeini. As long as the clerics remain in control, we expect Tehran to emphasize Islamic ideology and to be wary of close relations with either superpower. With Khomeini gone, however, Tehran would probably move gradually to disengage from the war with Iraq. Still, tension between the two historical rivals would remain high.	25X1
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This paper was prepared by Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Persian Gulf Division, at the request of the	25X1
Director of Central Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division,	25X1
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All leading clerical contenders for power support the export of the revolution and some terrorist activity. As a result, we would expect Iran to continue subversive activities in the Persian Gulf and to sustain efforts to undermine US interests in the Middle East even after Khomeini's death. Eventually, however, violent export of the revolution is likely to become a key issue between moderate and radical factions.

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Over the longer term, there is a significant chance that competition for power among the clerics will threaten the regime's stability. There are currently no obvious alternatives to a clerical regime. A Revolutionary Guard leader who could obtain some clerical support and claim continuity with the Islamic Revolution might be able to seize power during a prolonged period of instability. Ideological hostility in the Guard makes it unlikely that such a successor regime would be pro-West. The regular military is even more closely controlled than the Guard and even less likely to take power. Neither the Shah's son nor any other Iranian exile leader possesses the necessary domestic assets to shape Iran's political future.

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If Iran experienced prolonged upheaval, the Soviets would enjoy expanded opportunities for exploitation, particularly among Iran's ethnic minorities. We continue to doubt, however, that Moscow would be able to control events in Iran. Its best hope probably lies in the chance that a weakened central government in Tehran, particularly a Revolutionary Guard government, would look to Moscow for support and assistance.

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Succession Mechanics

The Islamic Republic's constitution mandates that the succession to Khomeini's post as supreme political-religious authority be formally decided by a cleric-dominated, 60-man Assembly of Experts in religious law. The constitution allows a choice between a single heir or a leadership council of three or five top level clerics. Since Khomeini's recent illnesses, leading Iranian clerics have intensified efforts to prepare for Khomeini's succession while trying to avoid any public signs of urgency. In late July, for example, a subcommittee of clerics from the Assembly of Experts was named to define in detail the succession process.

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If Khomeini were to die suddenly, a quick decision to tap Ayatollah Hosein Montazeri is likely. He has long been considered Khomeini's preferred choice as heir, and such a move would provide a visible sign of continuity. Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, second only to Khomeini in political power, endorsed Montazeri last month, and the government-controlled press now refers to Montazeri as a "Grand Ayatollah" in an effort to raise his religious standing. There are only around a half dozen other such senior clerics in Iran, including Khomeini.

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Montazeri, who for years has acted as Khomeini's de facto deputy on a variety of important matters, has a reputation as a hardliner on the war and on the strict observance of Islamic law. In recent weeks, however, he has softened his public positions on such issues as the war and social policy, suggesting that he is trying to broaden his political base. Montazeri is about 60 years old. He was tortured while in jail under the Shah, weakening his health, but he is not known to have any life-threatening illnesses.

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The Struggle for Power

Clerical infighting would not end with Montazeri's succession to Khomeini's position. Montazeri lacks Khomeini's religious stature and charisma.

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We expect that clerics who now control competing governmental, religious, and revolutionary organizations will continue to fight for political power, even though Montazeri will have titular authority. Clerical politics in Iran are best understood by viewing the clergy as roughly divided into three groups along an ideological continuum. At one extreme are activists who advocate strict clerical supervision of society under the leadership of one supreme religious jurisprudent. In the middle are clerical moderates who argue for only generalized clerical supervision, with less direct intervention in the government. At the other extreme are quietists who oppose any clerical involvement in politics—and, hence, the whole structure of Khomeini's Islamic Republic. Although this group represents the traditional Shia view and, may have the largest number of adherents in Iran, its philosophy has kept it largely on the sidelines under Khomeini.

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Short-Term Policy Implications	
We expect competition among these individuals and their allies to increase as each attempts to impose his writ on Iranian politics. This struggle will affect both Iran's domestic and foreign policies as they are used as weapons for and against individuals vying for power. Last summer, Khomeini revealed he had written a 30-page will to be opened after his death.	25X1 25X1
The War with Iraq. Despite Khomeini's will, we expect that his death eventually will allow the regime to find some way out of the war with Iraq. senior figures in the government, the regular military, and even the Revolutionary Guard doubt that Iran can defeat Iraq militarily. Iranian leaders are increasingly concerned by the growing war weariness at home.	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1



Still, the path toward an end to the war is likely to be lengthy and tortuous. Khomeini's clear identification with its continuation and with the demand to oust Iraqi President Saddam Husayn probably will require his heirs to allow some time to pass before they feel able to maneuver. His death, moreover, would deprive them of the one person with the stature to bless a compromise solution. Although concerned about war weariness, the regime would also fear that ending the war short of victory would call into question Tehran's claim of religious invincibility.	25 X 1
Whatever the eventual outcome, the long term geopolitical struggle between Iran and Iraq will continue. Moreover, should the Iranian succession degenerate into open factional fighting, Baghdad is likely to provide clandestine support to one of the factions in the effort to mold the outcome in its favor.	25X1
The Superpowers. Relations with both superpowers are unlikely to improve anytime soon. Political rivals will seek to discredit proponents of such moves, and the image of the US "satan" will be too important a symbol of continuity with Khomeini's legacy to allow any quick improvement in relations. Moscow also will be unable to make rapid political gainsmost clerics are deeply suspicious of the USSR and hostile to Communist ideology. Moscow's military support to Baghdad, moreover, represents another serious constraint. On the other hand, there appears to be a consensus for continuing to improve relations with other industrialized countries, such as West Germany and Japan, whose products and expertise are essential to the sustaining of the Iranian economy.	25 X 1
Terrorism. There is also a wide clerical consensus on the "export of the revolution." Most prominent clericsparticularly Ayatollah Montazerihave been associated with some terrorist activity. Montazeri also has been an advocate of close Iranian ties with Libya. If the struggle for power coalesces around moderate and radical factions, Iranian support for subversion and terrorism are likely to be key issues of dispute.	25X1 25X1
Economy. Clerical infighting probably will cause Iran's already serious economic problems to worsen. Disputes between activists pushing for strong central control, and conservatives who favor decentralization and private enterprise, have so far hampered implementation of any coherent economic development strategy. We doubt either group soon will become strong enough to impose its views on the other, and Iran's economy will continue to stagnate, leading to additional social unrest.	25X1
The Longer Term	
Over the longer term, Iran's political future remains clouded. At a minimum, however, it is clear that without Khomeini, no one will have the stature to cap clerical infighting. If this competition does get out of hand, clerics with close ties to various elements within the regular military and the Revolutionary Guard may seek their aid, raising the prospects for civil war, anarchy, and the disintegration of Iran.	25X1
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If a post-Khomeini Islamic regime does fall, we believe t successor would eventually emerge from the military, with some backing. Either or both the Army and the Revolutionary Guard involved, but the Guard is more likely to play a decisive role purges within the regular military and the ideological hostili in the Guard, we doubt that any such coalition would be pro-We more likely espouse nonalignment and for some time be inward lattempting to consolidate firm control.	could be could be . Given the ty to the West est. It would
A prolonged period of upheaval would provide the Soviets expanded opportunities in Iran, especially among Iran's ethnialong their common border. We believe, however, that the Soviinfluence events in Iran would be limitedmany of their asset up following crackdowns on the Tudeh party and the Mujahedin, willingness to act boldly will be restrained by their experient Afghanistan and by the possibility of superpower confrontation	c minorities ets' ability to s were wrapped and their ce in
The Soviets are likely to court the new regime while cove their assets. They probably will hope that a weakened governme would seek Moscow's support and assistance, providing the USSR access. This most likely would occur if a Revolutionary Guard control with the assistance of left-leaning lay Islamic technology me might be tempted to look to the Soviets for both milital assistance. Alternatively, Iranian leaders in a weakened post.	ent in Tehran with direct leader assumed crats. Such a ry and economic

might fear that the Soviets would take actions along their common border or in

Iraq or Afghanistan that would threaten Iran, and as a result could be


accomodating to Moscow.

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Directorate of Intelligence	
The Iranian Armed Forces: Clerical Control and Military Effectiveness	25X
An Intelligence Assessment	
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Information available as of 15 August 1984 has been used in the preparation of this paper	25>

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		Table of Contents		
		Key Judgments		
			•	25X1
-		The Revolutionary Guard and Basij	,	
				25X1
		Prospects	1	
		Implications for the United States.		

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Key Judgments

Five years after the Iranian revolution and the continuing purges of the military, Iran's clerical leadership remains suspicious of the loyalty of the country's Army, Navy, and Air Force. To monitor the loyalty and performance of these services Tehran has created a political control apparatus attached to all regular armed forces units. Independent of the Ministry of Defense, this Organization for Ideology is directed and staffed by clerics loyal to the clerical government and Ayatollah Khomeini.

--The system of informers and political/ideological officers is so extensive that we judge the regular Iranian armed forces are unable to pose a serious threat to the clerical regime.

The clerics also have attempted to counterbalance the regular forces by transforming two irregular organizations—the.

Revolutionary Guard and the Basij militia—into a major military force that is more loyal to the regime.

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
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	25 X ′
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Clashes between the Army and the Guardperhaps leading to a	
civil warare likely if a lengthy succession crisis occurs	
after Khomeini's death.	
The regular armed forces are weakened, however, by divided	
loyalties and indecisiveness and probably would have difficulty	
defeating the 500,000 or more Guard and Basij troops now under	25X1
arms.	
Although the creation of a political/ideological apparatus has	
increased Tehran's control over the armed services, we believe it	
also has contributed to Iran's military ineffectiveness against	
Iraq. Clerical interference and intimidation and the regular	
military's fear that the Revolutionary Guard will eventually replace	
it have hindered operations and lowered morale. Lack of cooperation	
between Army and irregular units has resulted in heavy casualties	
and missed opportunities throughout the war.	25 X ′
Tehran probably believes that the enhanced security provided by	
the control apparatus offsets the cost of reduced military .	
effectiveness and that surveillance of the military should be	
increased. Iranian clerics probably believe that military	
effectiveness will increase as more personnel are indoctrinated and	
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We believe the clerical regime will combine and reorganize the
existing armed forces and combat units of the Revolutionary Guard
into new military services after the war. The political/ideological
apparatus in the new armed forces will help strengthen Iran's
ability to defend itself against foreign military threats by
instilling loyalty and obedience throughout the services. A sizable
Revolutionary Guard organization will continue to exist, however, to
maintain internal security, operate abroad, and counterbalance the
regular Iranian military. 25X1
(end of Key Judgments)

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Iran's clerical regime has consolidated its control over the	
country and has resisted the Iraqi invasion, but it continues to	
doubt the loyalty of the regular Iranian armed forces. To deal	
with this problem, Tehran has built an extensive organization to	25X1
monitor the armed forces' loyalty and increase their willingness	
to fight. The regime has succeeded in controlling the armed	
forces by establishing a broad network of informants and by using	
the irregular forces to counterbalance the regular services.	
elements in the Army, Navy, and Air	25 X 1
Force still had not accepted the Islamic revolution and did not	
support the government	25X1
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Controlling the Deculer Armed Forest	
Controlling the Regular Armed Forces	
Structure. The Iranian clerical leadership depends primarily	
on the Organization for IdeologySazman-e Ideologto monitor and	
promote the loyalty of the regular armed forces. The Sazman has	
units and personnel assigned to all levels within the Army, Navy,	
and Air Force, These	25X1
political-ideological units are responsible for disseminating	
propaganda, propagating Islamic tenets, and, most importantly,	
maintaining "ideological security" and carrying out	
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counterintelligence operations
Sazman units do not report to the Ministry of
Defense, their nominal superior, but go outside military channel
directly to a separate Sazman directorate overseeing the armed
forces. Mohammad Reyshairi heads the Organization for Ideology.
He is also Chief Justice of the Revolutionary Court system and a
confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini and probably reports directly to
him
Sazman political/ideolog
ical bureaus, units, or officers are attached to all armed force
nits down to the platoon or barracks level. Airbases, for
example, have a ratio of about one political official to 100 Air
Force personnel A cleric
appointed by Tehran usually commands each Sazman office, although
crusted military officers sometimes head a few ideological units.
The political control officials appear to maintain close
iaison with Revolutionary Courts and Revolutionary "Komitehs" to
ncrease regime authority over the military. The Revolutionary
Courts and military police arrest, prosecute, try, and punish
ruspects The "Komitehs," made up
ostly of noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, apparently
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hief of the political/ideological unit sometimes is a member of

Political Control Structure of the Iranian Armed Forces






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these other organizations or can direct them to arrest offenders,	25
according to Iranian officers.	2
Enforcement. The Sazman units use an extensive system of	
informers to provide information on disloyal activity in the	
military. Names are then turned	2
over to the military police and Revolutionary Courts for arrest	
and trial.	2
political/ideological officials have taken advantage of the	
traditional animosity between officers, warrant officers, and	
enlisted men to foment distrust and elicit information on	
disloyalty. We estimate that the political units have thousands	
of informers in the Iranian armed forces. In larger Iranian Army	
units, the political ideological units command "strike groups"	
that follow regular units into battle to prevent them from	
deserting	2
the threat of reporting suspect	2
activity to Tehran gives political officials control over the	
decisions of the regular military unit commander. Political	
officials can influence an officer's actions by forwarding the	
findings of the "Komitehs" in each unit that periodically meet to	
assess and criticize the unit commander's performance.	2
clerics directing	25
political/ideological units were the real commanders of the bases.	
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There are no reliable reports on the number of soldiers
clerics were preparing to remove about 300 politically suspect
officers and enlisted men from combat positions in 1983
We believe, however, that the number of
military personnel arrested or executed annually is under a
thousandless than 1 percent of the 300,000 men in the regular
forces.
The number probably has declined
in the last year because most officers loval to the old regime
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academies and vouch for their political reliability. Six months	
before an officer becomes eligible for promotion, he must attend a	
three-month series of indoctrination classes taught by clerics	
that stress sacrifice and martyrdom for the regime	25)
	25)
The clerical leadership has been careful to assign loyal or	
obedient officers to top military commands and probably exploits	
disagreements between them to increase the regime's security.	
General Qasim Zahirnejad owes his reinstatement in the post-	:
revolution Army, his promotion to general, and his appointment as	
chief of the Joint Armed Forces Staff to his family ties with	
influential clerics	25)
Colonel Ali Sayyed Shirazi was appointed commander of the Iranian	0.5
ground forces because of his	25)
devotion to Islam and his relationship with Ayatollah Montazeri,	
Khomeini's heir apparent. Zahirnejad	25)
and Shirazi often are at odds over the conduct of the war, but the	
clerical leadership probably believes that disagreements among top	
officers reduce the chances they will unite in a military coup.	25) 25)
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The regime also tries to buy the loyalty of some servicemen,	0.5
especially those with critical skills in the Air Force	25) 25X
Air Force officers have received	207
gifts of land, scarce consumer goods, fuel, and low-cost housing.	
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	25)





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These privileges often go to people close to the clerics, wh	25 X 1
others who have served the country well are ignored	25X1
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The Revolutionary Guard and Basij

The clerical leadership also has formed and maintains the Revolutionary Guard Corps--Sepah-e Pasdaran-- and the Basij militia at least partly as an alternative or counterbalancing, military force to the traditional armed forces. Unlike the Army, Navy, and Air Force, whose loyalty is still largely questionable because of their association with the Shah and Western training, the Guard is manned by personnel chosen for their loyalty to the new regime. The Iranian leadership views the Revolutionary Guard as an elite force that is the protector of the regime against a military coup, according to press statements

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Controlling the Guard. Tehran has developed an extensive political control structure to oversee the Revolutionary Guard and Basij that is similar to the apparatus attached to the regular services. The Guard is directly subordinate to Ayatollah Khomeini through his personnal representative to the Corps, the cleric Fazlollah Mahallati, according to press reports. Mahallati sits on the Supreme Council of the Revolutionary Guard and also heads

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the Guard's Supreme Directorate of Ideological and Political	
Affairs, which is responsible for monitoring the political	
reliability of Guard personnel.	25X1
The Directorate appears to function in much the same way as	
Sazman units in the regular armed forces. Directorate officials	
are attached to all Revolutionary Guard and Basij units to oversee	
propaganda, select new recruits, and oversee the activities and	
decisions of unit commanders. In mid-1984 in a press interview,	
Mahallati stated that there were 250 clergy providing ideological	•
training in the Guards. We estimate that there are thousands of	
officials and informers responsible for political control in the	
Guard and Basij.	25X1
Even more than in the regular services, Tehran has been	
careful to select men to command the Revolutionary Guard who have	
proven their loyalty to the revolution and have an interest in the	
survival of the regime and its leaders. Mohsen Rafiq-dust owes	
his appointment as Minister of the Revolutionary Guard to his	
close relationship with Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani	25X1
Rafiq-dust	25 X 1
first came to the attention and favor of Ayatollah Khomeini	
because of his willingness to execute a number of the Shah's	
senior military and police officials. Mohsen Rezai became	
commander of the Revolutionary Guard when he was friendly with	
Rafiq-dust and because he may be related to President Khamenei,	
according to sources of varying reliability.	25 X 1
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A Rival to the	Armed Forces. The major role of the
	in the war against Iraq has increased its
•	
	ities as a military competitor to the Army.
	Guard's abilities to counter the regular Army
	ggle have also grown.
Guard	troops have often borne the brunt of the
ighting and, becau	se of their aggressiveness, have helped win
ome major battles.	
	an Iranian official
tates that there a:	re 120,000 armed Revolutionary Guards.
	and the state of t
High-ranking Gua	rd officials have claimed that the Guard
ventually will repl	ace the traditional services and it has
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ventually will repl ttempted to assume avy, and air force	ace the traditional services and it has the functions and capabilities of an army, over the last four years.
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Estimated Iranian Military Manpower July 1984

Army	235,000
Air Force	50,000
Navy	15,000

Revolutionary Guards 100,000-150,000
Basij over 500,000

joint Revolutionary Guard Air Force command in early 1983. A
Guard official claimed in early 1983 that Guards were learning to
fly jet fighter aircraft in Syria and that the Guard wanted to
establish its own flight school. The pilots from this school were
to make up the nucleus of the future Revolutionary Guard Air
T
12 Guards were
sent to East Germany for training on MIG-19 and MIG-21 fighter
aircraft in early July. There is no other evidence that Guards
are being trained on fighter aircraft
The Guard has tried to
purchase transports and helicopters
Revolutionary Guard naval units have formed joint commands
with regular Navy forces for operations in the Persian Gulf. In
mid-December 1982 Guard officials attempted to gain control over
the Navy through a request to share naval facilities
Guard personnel serve on some regular
Navy vessels
Revolutionary Guard naval units assumed responsibility for the
defense and patrol of Iran's coasts in February 1983.
the Guard has
received new patrol boats in the last year.
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In late 1070 the results
In late 1979 the Iranian regime created the Basij
"Mobilization of the Oppressed" in response to Ayatollah
Khomeini's call for a 20 million-man army to defend against a
possible US invasion and later to fight Iraq
The Basij is a lightly armed and poorly trained
militia that has provided the Revolutionary Guard with the masses
of expendable but fanatical manpower to launch "human wave"
attacks. Revolutionary Guard cadres are responsible for training,
arming, and commanding Basij units
as of
mid 1984 there were 700,000 armed Basij troops, although the
Iranians claim publicly that the organization has 2.5 million
members.
Impact on Military Effectiveness
Low Morale. The creation of an extensive political control
organization in the armed forces has reduced the threat of a
military coup, but it has also hurt military effectiveness and has
not stopped an apparent decline in the services' will to fight.
the
Iranian Army did not support the war effort and was not willing to
pursue victory against Iraq. Army units sent to the front lines
in June 1984 had little desire to wage war and suffered a large
number of desertions
The
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Army's reluctance to fight tends to be confirmed by casualty	
statistics indicate that the Army	25X1
suffered only 2,000 casualties in combat early this year compared	
with Revolutionary Guard and Basij losses of over 32,000.	25X1
	25X1
Interference by clerics or political officials in the conduct	
of military operations appears to be one of the main causes of	
military ineffectiveness and the decline in officer morale.	25X1
there was	25X1
widespread discontent among middle level and senior officers about	
the clerical leadership's interference with planning and combat.	
orders from clerics make little	25X1
sense and are not enforceable without disrupting operations. The	
undermining of officers' authority by the clerics also has	
demoralized middle level commanders in the Army, Navy, and Air	
Force The presence of clerical	25 X 1
military "advisers" has disrupted the chain of command because	
when they have the backing of political officials, junior and	
noncommissioned officers sometimes refuse to obey orders from more	
senior officers.	25X1
Existion Between Bandana and	
Friction Between Regulars and Irregulars. The development of	
the Revolutionary Guard and threats that it will eventually	
replace the regular services have further undermined Iranian	
military effectiveness. Press statements by leading Iranian	
· ·	25X1

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officialsincluding Khomeinipromising that the regular services	
	25 X ′
will not be dissolved have not calmed fears among officers.	25X
that a wistown ever last all its answer to the state of t	
that a victory over Iraq would be a victory of the Revolutionary	25X ²
Guard over the Army.	207
officers believe the clerical regime is using the war to weaken	
the armed forces so they will be easier to disband once the	25X ²
conflict ends.	20/
Animosity between the Revolutionary Guard and the regular	
services occasionally erupts into clashes. In June 1982 20 Guards	
were killed in a shootout between Guard and Army personnel at an	
Army base near Esfahan	25 X ′
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in May 1984 Revolutionary Guards in Shiraz	25X
were used to put down a mutiny by an Army unit that refused to	
leave for the front.	25 X
Problems on the Battlefield. Tehran's attempts to integrate	
Revolutionary Guard units with the regular services in "joint	
commands" on the battlefield have fostered only a surface unity	
and have not improved coordination or military effectiveness.	25X
	25X

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uestions abo	out the Army's	s willingness	to fight ha	ve caused the	
asij to refu	ise orders fro	om the Army a	nd led to a	near total lac	k
I communicat	ion between t	the two group:	5		
Although	Tehran probab	oly has increa	ased its poli	itical control	
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ver the arme	d forces and	the conduct of	of operations	by combining	
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The integr	and Revolutio on the battl	onary Guard in	educated Revo	olutionary	

reduce effic	ciency in some operations. A lack of training and
	caused Basij troops to panic and led to the failure of
attacks in e	
	hogange Cuend will
lack even a	high school education, they are too ignorant to fly
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	any of the helicopters they attempt to pilot.
	ry Guards assigned to ships have extremely limited
training	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
•	olutionary Guard, in turn, has complained that the
Army's lack	of support and aggressiveness has undermined joint
perations.	
Pa	avolutionary Cuard and David
	evolutionary Guard and Basij troops also have been
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Prospects

Regime Security. In our judgment, the extent of the regime's political control apparatus makes it unlikely that conspirators in the regular services could recruit and organize a sufficient number of units to carry out a successful coup. Moreover, we believe that no coup could succeed without the complicity or acquiescence of both Revolutionary Guard officers at Army commands and large numbers of Revolutionary Guard units. The Guard owes its existence and prosperity to the clerical regime and will not support plots that would replace its benefactors in Tehran with the military.

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If a power struggle develops, the Revolutionary Guard is likely to play a more important role than the armed forces in determining a successor to Khomeini in the short term. The Guard maintains extensive internal security forces inside Iran —particularly in the capital and other major cities—while almost all Army units are at the front. The Guard also can call up Basij militia in any area of the country. A faction controlling Revolutionary Guard units probably would use them to seize key power centers quickly after Khomeini's death to solidify its control. At the same time, political control officials in the

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services would try to keep regular armed forces units in garrison to prevent a coup during a succession crisis. Moreover, because they fear being charged with disloyalty by political officials, Army commanders probably would be reluctant to favor one contending faction in Tehran over another.

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The regular armed forces probably would be drawn into a conflict— perhaps leading to a civil war—if a power struggle among clerics continued for at least several months. Such a conflict could begin if one clerical faction ordered Revolutionary Guards to neutralize armed forces units and another ordered these units to resist. Because of indecisiveness and divided loyalty, the regular armed forces would have difficulty winning such a conflict. Some ideologically committed Army commanders probably would lead their units to side with the Guard, further reducing the chance that the military would prevail. Although the Guard is inferior in manpower and equipment to the regular services, it probably would remain unified and could mobilize hundreds of thousands of Basij troops to support its cause.

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Military Effectiveness. Rivalry and mistrust between the regular armed services and the Revolutionary Guard will continue to limit Iranian military effectiveness against Iraq and other military opponents for the foreseeable future. The regime's political control measures will impose an outward appearance of loyalty or acquiescence in the Army, Navy, and Air Force but will

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not cause them to fight more effectively or vigorously against Iraq. Because of its fear of a takeover by the Revolutionary Guard and a desire to limit its own losses, the Army will delay attacks, withhold assistance, and attempt to force the Guard to bear the burden of fighting. Revolutionary Guard suspicion of the regular military's loyalty and the Guard's unwillingness to subordinate its troops completely to the regular military command will lead to additional missed opportunities and heavy casualties.

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The Iranian regime, however, appears to believe that the control gained by both the political apparatus in the military and the use of the Revolutionary Guard as a counterbalance to the regulars is worth the present military ineffectiveness. Moreover, Tehran probably believes that overall Iranian military effectiveness will eventually improve. The Revolutionary Guard will gain additional military expertise in combat and will grow stronger as it expands into a force that includes artillery, armor, air, and naval units. Through combat attrition, control of promotions and assignments, and officer selection, the regime also will reman the Army, Navy, and Air Force with personnel who will work with the Guards.

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A New Iranian Armed Forces. In our judgment, after the war Tehran will combine the armed forces and combat units of the Revolutionary Guard and reorganize them into new, more loyal

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military services. The new military probably will be staffed primarily by personnel from the existing Guard, although some men from the old armed forces who had proven their loyalty would be included. Most of the present regular forces personnel are likely to be retired immediately after the war—those needed in technical positions would be retained only until politically loyal replacements are trained. The clerical leadership understands the need for competent personnel to fight Iraq, however, and does not want to further weaken Iran's war effort by launching a destabilizing reorganization during the conflict.

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In any event, we believe Tehran will continue to maintain a Revolutionary Guard organization—independent of the Ministry of Defense—as a possible hedge against future disloyalty even in the new, reformed Iranian armed forces. The Guard will be an elite force primarily responsible for internal security and for covert operations abroad. Moreover, the Guard probably would retain control over a Basij militia organization as a large-scale source of manpower outside the regular services' influence.

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Implications for the United States

For the foreseeable future the clerical regime will continue to believe that the United States and other Western countries are attempting to foment sedition within the armed forces. The purging of regular servicemen associated with the West has reduced

significantly the number of officers who support a more favorable relationship with the United States. Moreover, we believe the political control organizations probably will be fairly effective in discovering and eliminating efforts by any country to influence Iranian military personnel in Iran or abroad. The gradual remanning of the services with men indoctrinated against the United States will make it even more difficult for the United States to exert influence on Iran's new military.

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In the long term, especially after the postwar reformation of the armed forces, we believe the political/ideological organization in the military will help strengthen Iran's ability to defend itself against foreign military threats. The new unified armed forces will eliminate some coordination problems. Continuing indoctrination will help instill a fanaticism, similar to that seen in Revolutionary Guard and Basij units, among Iranian enlisted men that would stiffen efforts to defend Iran against any attacker. A new, loyal officer corps will slowly emerge from the reorganized Iranian military academies. They will bring greater professionalism to the military and will replace incompetent "political" commanders appointed during the war with Iraq.